Friday, November 25, 2016

The Problem of Adam [Pt. 2]

by Hiram R. Diaz III
As noted elsewhere,[1] the idea that being-dead is equivalent to being-a-lifeless-non-conscious-body is logically and Scripturally untenable. It was shown that, given the law of transitivity, the identification of the two states of being entails an absurd conclusion, viz. Adam was dead before death existed. Death, it was noted, is a fundamentally unique experience entailing a fundamentally unique state of being-dead that could not exist prior to the fall. What was not investigated, however, was the obverse of the proposition “To be dead is to be a lifeless, non-conscious body.” The proposition in mind is this: “To be alive is to a be living, conscious body.” The proposition and its obverse were simply assumed for the sake of argument. However, the current article will demonstrate the logical incoherence of the annihilationist belief that being-dead is equivalent to being-a-lifeless-non-conscious-body.
Every Body’s Non-Conscious
Consider the original assertion:
To be dead is to be a lifeless, non-conscious body.
Now consider its obverse:
To be alive is to be a living, conscious body.
Whereas the attribution of life to the body is categorically correct, the attribution of consciousness to the body is not. Consciousness is an attribute of persons, not bodies. Consequently, to attribute consciousness to a body is to commit a category error. No body is conscious. Rather, every body is non-conscious. Thus, death may entail the reduction of the living body to lifelessness. However, death does not entail the reduction of the conscious body to a non-conscious body, for no body is conscious.
This category error obtains, it should be noted, even under the assumption of anthropological monism. Anthropological monism postulates that the mind is supervenient upon the brain/body. Given this view, therefore, there is a categorical distinction to be drawn between the body and that which is supervenient upon the body, viz. The mind. This is significant given the annihilationist belief that the non-consciousness of the dead body is taken to be an attribute only of the dead body. In reality, non-consciousness is an attribute of living and dead bodies and, therefore, cannot be said to be the result of one having died. Non-consciousness is an attribute of all existent bodies.
Concluding Remarks
Given that lifelessness is not equivalent to death, and given that every body is non-conscious, neither lifelessness nor non-consciousness can be identified as essential attributes of deadness. Consequently, if the death of the body entails its lifelessness, and the non-consciousness of the body is essential to its being a body and not a mind, then one can only, at the most, state that the second death entails the lifelessness of the body. Annihilationists who believe that the dead are those who have been reduced to lifeless, non-conscious bodies are wrong for these two reasons. The law of transitivity demands that the annihilationist either abandon his belief that deadness essentially consists in being a lifeless body. Moreover, belief that deadness also essentially consists in the non-consciousness of the body must be abandoned as well, seeing as it is an essential attribute of all bodies, living and dead alike.

[1] See Diaz, Hiram R. “The Problem of Adam [Pt. 1],” Biblical Trinitarian,


  1. On what do you ground this assertion that all bodies are non-conscious?

    1. On the basis of logic. It is a category error to attribute consciousness to the body. Consciousness is a property of minds, not bodies.

      A body may produce a mind which, in turn, has the property of being-conscious or consciousness, if we assume the monist position for the sake of argument.

      But even then, the property of consciousness would not be attributable to the body but the mind.

      Bodies lack consciousness. Minds may or may not lack consciousness (for the sake of argument).