Tuesday, February 13, 2018

Diversity Without Unity: A [Post]Modern Myth

by Hiram R. Diaz III
Milk is Milk
Whereas philosophical modernism embraced the belief that there was one unifying conception of reality that could be grasped by philosophical reflection or scientific discovery, postmodernism vigorously rejected this belief and replaced it with radical pluralism. Ironically, postmodernism reduced any attempt to think categorically to a culturally relative power-grab. To think categorically, in other words, was to exercise control over “others” (i.e. those who do not meet the socio-cultural conditions requisite to being a member of one’s group), specifically by ignoring supposed irreducible differences between individuals or groups constituting the “others.” This resulted in the fragmentation of virtually all academic disciplines, rendering categorical headings such as “Philosophy” or “Religion” virtually meaningless. For if there is no unifying concept of what a “religion” is, then in what way can one say that Christianity and Islam, for instance, are both members of the universal category “Religion”? Does it not seem to follow, given the rejection of universals and universal categories, that there is not one concept of “Religion” which can apply to all supposed religions?
Though the postmodernist movement has died, its deleterious intellectual and sociological effects are still being felt, even in the field of apologetics. For instance, it is common to hear the assertion “Not all proponents of x believe that x is y,” an assertion that gives the appearance of charitability but is, ultimately, an empty phrase. If John is a proponent of x, and Joe is a proponent of x, then both are proponents of x. To be blunt — John’s x and Joe’s x are identical at some point. There is no irreducible difference between John’s x and Joe’s x; therefore, it is not merely allowable but necessary to assert that John and Joe, because they believe x share certain beliefs about x in common. So far, we have spoken only of two individuals believing x. However, the same is true of a group of innumerable persons who subscribe to x. The assertion that believers in x share some core of beliefs in common is a logical necessity that can only be denied upon pain of absurdity and self-contradiction.
Consider the following excerpt from Ro Waseem’s article “A Monolithic Islam? Forget About It!” Waseem writes —
We must realize that Islam is not a monolith, and that it’s impossible for nearly 2 billion Muslims to share the same interpretation of it. There is no “true” Islam, I would argue. Rather, what we have are Islams. At best, the “true” Islam, in my opinion, is relative to the person and is the interpretation that allows you to grow and evolve the most as a person, provided—a very important distinction to make–provided that the core of the Quran is not tempered with.[1]
Note that Waseem, on the one hand, denies that there is a “true” Islam, but on the other hand states that there are “Islams.” This is self-contradictory, since there can only be multiples of a particular idea or thing if there is an essential property or set of properties which set that idea or thing apart from all others. When one buys milk, for example, he goes to the milk freezer and finds many kinds of milk, all of which have some essential property or set of properties unique to milk. As much as postmodernist influenced thinkers hate to admit it: Milk is milk. It is self-contradictory to say that there is no true Islam, but there are many Islams, for there can only be many Islams if Islam has essential properties without which it would not exist (i.e. if there were as true Islam).
Waseem apparently knows this, moreover, seeing as he goes on to contradict himself explicitly when he says — 
At best, the “true” Islam, in my opinion, is relative to the person and is the interpretation that allows you to grow and evolve the most as a person, provided—a very important distinction to make–provided that the core of the Quran is not tempered [sic.] with.
On the one hand, Waseem states that “true” Islam is “relative to the person.” Yet on the other hand, he states that there is a core of the Quran that is not to be tampered with. The first assertion denies any objective standard for judging what is or is not Islam, the second affirms that there is an objective standard that cannot be tampered with. These are mutually exclusive beliefs. If one is true, the other is false. They cannot both be true at the same time and in the same sense.
The Fallacy of Equivocation
The only way in which one could possibly believe that there is and is not a true Islam is if one equivocates on his definition of the word “Islam.” On the one hand, “Islam” would be defined as “the Quranic core that may not be tampered with.” On the other hand, “Islam” would be defined as “the personal articulation (i.e. practice and development, either personally or communally) of the Quranic core that may not be tampered with.” Thus, there can be a true Islam, comprised of the Quranic core, and many Islams, comprised of personal articulations of the Quranic core, without there being a contradiction. Not identifying these two meanings of Islam, however, leads to self-contradiction and confusion, and it is typically a means of deceiving the unwary.
This is a common rhetorical trick used by heretics, cultists, and other enemies of Christ when they are presented with a general criticism of some doctrine x. By stating “Not all proponents of x believe the same thing,” the opponent of Christ is suspending all former and future criticisms against his position by not identifying his position at all. Given that people of even the closest associations often entertain widely differing beliefs about some reality they both hold to be the case, simply stating that “Not all proponents of x believe the same thing” is a trivial objection, for all of the proponents of x are in absolute agreement in the following ways —
  1. All proponents of x believe x to be the case.
  2. All proponents of x believe x has properties a, b, such that it would cease to be x without them.
And this is where the debate takes place —
  1. Is x the case?
  2. Is it the case that x has properties a, b, such that it would cease to be x without them?
For in order for there to be a class of individuals who may be said to be proponents of x, they must all affirm that x is the case, otherwise of what would they be proponents? And if x is anything, then it is something with essential properties apart from which it would cease to be itself — otherwise how would they differentiate x from all other beliefs?
More to the point, how could a criticism be leveled against x, if x has no fixed definition? It cannot be, and that is the point.
The way in which we may successfully deal with the trivial objection “Not all proponents of x believe the same thing” is by clearly articulating what it is our opponent is claiming. If it is his claim that no two proponents of x believe that x is the case and that it has properties a, b, & c such that if it lost them it would cease to be x, then it is not only the case that our criticisms of his belief do not hold, it is also necessarily the case that his counter criticisms also do not hold, for there would be no x to contend for or against. Moreover, if there are no two proponents of x who believe the same thing, then any appeals to another supposed defender of x’s research, argumentation, etc are irrelevant, for their research, argumentation, etc are put in defense not of x but of something else.
Concluding Remarks
If we are to clearly demonstrate that the enemies of Christ are espousing falsehoods and seeking to defend them by employing rhetorical tricks, we must seek to be precise in our analysis of their claims and argumentation. It is important to remember this, especially when facing those enemies of Christ who claim to be faithful to the Bible and Biblical exegesis (e.g. Unitarians, Oneness Pentecostals, Annihilationists, etc), for the inevitable claim that we are delving into “philosophy” will arise as a second order defense against serious scrutiny of their belief, and this is not the case. It is likewise important to remember because the enemies of Christ may, on the other hand, state that a criticism that does not differentiate between all of the different varieties of x proponents is uncharitable and not to be taken seriously. It is either the case that one can ask as many questions as is needed in order for one to be precise and, therefore, “charitable” in his analysis of the proponents of x; or it is not the case that one can do this, for so doing renders one’s arguments philosophical and, therefore, irrelevant.

[1]http://www.patheos.com/blogs/quranalyzeit/2014/06/13/a-monolithic-islam-forget-about-it/#hixmra185pCMv7sZ.99, Accessed February 08, 2018.

Friday, January 26, 2018

A Christian Assessment of Reiki

by Michael R. Burgos Jr., PhD

Reiki is a spiritual practice that has become popularized within the United States in the last three decades. The term “Reiki” is defined variously as “universal life energy,”[1] and despite being characterized as “one of the most ancient methods of healing,”[2] Reiki was invented by Japanese Buddhist monk Mikao Usui in 1922,[3] and it was popularized in the west by Reiki practitioner Hawayo Takata.[4] Usui claimed to have ascended a mountain and after having engaged in a rigorous regimen of fasting, chanting, prayer, and meditation, he was alleged to have reached a state of enlightenment whereby “a great and powerful spiritual light entered the top of his head.”[5] From this experience, Usui claimed that he had obtained a kind of power that he could use to heal people. Armed with his healing power, he instituted “five principles that embody an awakened spiritual point of view.”[6] 

Within the west, Reiki is healing technique that attempts to manipulate a metaphysical “life force,” also called “Ki,” in order to instill a state of physical, spiritual, and emotional well-being a patient.[7] Reiki practitioners claim to be a channel of the life force, and the typical Reiki treatment consists of the practitioner touching their patient in strategic areas so as to manipulate the life force for the betterment of their patient.[8] Practitioners receive this ability when “a Reiki master opens healing channels (or chakras) within the students that fill them with life energy.”[9]

Proponents of Reiki claim that the practice is “Stands above any belief system,”[10] and that Reiki is not a religion. For instance, consider the following: 
While Reiki is spiritual in nature, it is not a religion. It has no dogma, and there is nothing you must believe in order to learn and use Reiki. In fact, Reiki is not dependent on belief at all and will work whether you believe in it or not. Because Reiki comes from God, many people find that using Reiki puts them more in touch with the experience of their religion rather than having only an intellectual concept of it. Reiki is not a religion.[11]
Although Reiki can be used as a spiritual practice, it is important to understand that Reiki, in itself, is not a religion. It does not promote any prescribed cultural activity, does not have the specific goal of becoming enlightened or connected to God, and does not require the practitioner to form a certain kind of faith. Reiki is, at its core, simply a means of promoting wellbeing and health through the laying on of hands [12]
While it is claimed by these authors that Reiki is not a religion, their own descriptions of Reiki betray such a claim. To practice Reiki, one must believe in its underlying worldview, namely pantheism[13] or panentheism.[14] That is, one must believe that there is an overriding universal life force that exists in the universe, and one must believe that a Reiki practitioner has the power to manipulate that life force. The notion that Reiki “has no dogma” is in direct contradiction with the notion that Reiki (i.e., the universal life energy) exists. The very statement, “Reiki comes from God,” is a theological claim born of religious belief. Moreover, why Reiki may not “prescribe cultural activity,” it does require its participant to believe that both pantheistic universal life energy is real and capable of healing people. Therefore, Reiki is intrinsically religious in nature, as it presupposes its own theology. 

Is Reiki compatible with biblical Christianity? Contra either pantheism or panentheism, the Bible insists upon an ontological distinction between the Creator and the creation,[15] and never affirms the existence of a kind of universal life energy. While there are some Reiki practitioners who attempt to identify the person of the Holy Spirit with the universal life force of Reiki,[16] this results in crude religious syncretism; the blending of pagan mythology with biblical truth. Stewart notes, 

Reiki is antithetical to biblical Christianity. Channeling is a way of communicating with spirits to obtain information not otherwise accessible. It is denounced in the Bible as sorcery, mediumship, and spiritism (Lev. 19:26, 31; 20:6; Deut. 18:9–14; Acts 19:19; Gal. 5:20; Rev. 21:8). Contacting spirit guides is dangerous spiritually, physically, and emotionally (1 Peter 5:8). Reiki practitioners seek what is called the Kundalini experience… This pinnacle of psychic experiences is known to cause severe emotional and psychological disturbances.[17]

To put it plainly, one cannot complement the Christian faith with a competing religious system that presupposes a completely different worldview. One cannot serve two masters (Matt 6:24), and therefore one cannot consistently affirm the biblical faith and Reiki. While Reiki has achieved a level of acceptance in the post-Christian west, it remains contrary to a biblically informed worldview.

[1] McClenton, Rhonda J., Spirits of Lesser Gods: A Critical Examination of Reiki and Christ-Centered Healing, (Boca Raton: Dissertation.com, 2005), 29. Hoskin, Liz, Reiki: An Introduction to Reiki, (Charlotte: CreateSpace, 2015), 10.
[2] Honervogt, Tanmaya, The Power of Reiki: An Ancient Hands-On Healing Technique, (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1998), 22. This author, as do many others, attempt to identify the practice of Reiki in ancient Sanskrit texts. However, such an attempt is anachronistic and clearly false as Usui’s inability to find anything in the sutras was the impetus to his alleged ascension up Mt. Kurama. 
[3] Lübeck, Walter, Petter, Frank A., Rand, William L., The Spirit of Reiki: The Complete Handbook of the Reiki System, (Twin Lakes: Lotus Press, 2001), 13.
[4] Ibid., 24-28.
[5] Ibid. There is a considerable amount of mythology that has been propagated regarding Usui. The common claims that Usui was a Christian minister who taught at a Christian school, as well as the claim that he had achieve a doctorate in theology from the Univ. of Chicago are all untrue. See also McClenton, Spirits of Lesser Gods, 36-38.
[6] Bevell, Brett, Reiki for Spiritual Healing, (New York: Random House, 2009), 3.
[7] Boräng, Kajsa Krishni, Principles of Reiki: What It Is & How It Works, Rev. Ed., (Philadelphia: Slinging Dragon, 2013), 21.
[8] Ibid., 22. Usui, Makao, Petter, Frank A., The Original Reiki Handbook of Dr. Mikao Usui, 4th Ed., (Twin Lakes: Lotus Press, 2003), 17-23.
[9] Stewart, G., Basic Questions on Alternative Medicine: What is Good and What is Not?, (Grand Rapids: Kregel Pub., 1998), 62.
[10] Boräng, Principles of Reiki, 23.
[11] 2018. “What is Reiki?,” The International Center for Reiki, Traininghttp://www.reiki.org/faq/whatisreiki.html. 
[12] Koda, Katalin, Sacred Path of Reiki: Healing as a Spiritual Discipline, (Woodbury: Llewellyn Pub., 2008), 205.
[13] “Pantheism is the belief that God and the universe are identical.” Cross, F. L., & Livingstone, E. A., Eds., The Oxford dictionary of the Christian Church, 3rd Ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1223.
[14] Panentheism is “The belief that the Being of God includes and penetrates the whole universe, so that every part of it exists in Him, but…that His Being is more than, and is not exhausted by, the universe.” Ibid., 1221.
[15] E.g., Gen 1:1; 1 Cor 8:6. 
[16] Brown, Candy G., Healing Gods: Complementary and Alternative Medicine in Christian America, (New York: Oxford Univ. Press), 2013. 78.O’ Mathuna, Donal, Larimore, Walt, Alternative Medicine, Updated & Expanded Ed., (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2006), 254.
[17] Stewart, Basic Questions, 63.

Tuesday, January 2, 2018

Is the Logos of God a Person or an Impersonal Plan?

by Hiram R. Diaz III
Preliminary Remarks
Regarding the demonstration or refutation of any professedly Christian doctrine, the Scriptures alone are sufficient. Thus, when considering whether or not the Logos of God has always existed as a distinct Person of the Godhead, eternally in co-equal fellowship with the Father and the Holy Spirit, we rely solely on the Scriptures. What follows in this essay is not a defense of the Personhood of the Logos prior to his incarnation per se, but a refutation of a popular claim made by Oneness theologians, viz. that the Logos was an a-personal divine plan in the mind of God. In particular, the claim that the distinct Personhood of the Logos is derived from pagan philosophy will be refuted. Additionally, some remarks will be made about the possible Semitic precursors (i.e. the Memra and Metatron) to the Scriptural doctrine of the distinct Personhood of the Logos, seeing as the mere existence of a Semitic Logos concept that shares many features of the doctrinal position held by Trinitarians contradicts opponents of the distinct Personhood of the Logos from all eternity.
Platonism, Neoplatonism, or Scriptural Exegesis?
“The Scriptures,” according to Oneness theologian David K. Bernard, “do not teach the doctrine of the trinity, but trinitarianism has its roots in paganism.”[1] This is because, he asserts, “Platonic and Neo-Platonic thought [...] had a major influence on the theology of the ancient church.”[2] Thus, he argues that
[the] trend toward trinitarianism began by making the Logos (the Word of John 1) a separate person. Following a thought in Greek philosophy, particularly in the teachings of Philo, some of the Greek apologists began to view the Logos as a separate person from the Father. This was not trinitarianism, however, but a form of binitarianism, and one that subordinated the Logos to the Father. To them the Father alone was the real God and the Logos was a created divine being of second rank.[3]
In John 1, the Word is God’s self-revelation, self-expression, or self-disclosure. Before the Incarnation, the Word was the thought, plan, reason, or mind of God. In the beginning, the Word was with God, not as a distinct person but as God Himself—pertaining to God much as a man and his word.[4]
Oneness theologians like Bernard oppose the idea that the Logos is a distinct person of the Godhead. The Logos of God, they argue instead, is an a-personal plan in God’s mind, despite the fact that this a-personal doctrine of the Logos is “exegetically untenable,”[5] as Edward Dalcour notes. “Oneness [theology] propagators reduce the Son to a mere ‘plan’ or ‘concept’ in the Father’s mind.”[6]
However, the Hellenized Jewish philosopher Philo “whose thought,” as Ronald Nash notes, “was an odd mixture of Platonism and Stoicism,”[7] and who is often cited as the source of John’s doctrine of the Logos,[8] actually taught that the “Logos‐Mediator was a metaphysical abstraction,” and “not a person or messiah or savior but a cosmic principle, postulated to solve various philosophical problems.[9] The pagan-influenced doctrine of the Logos, as contained in the writings of the Alexandrian philosopher Philo, in other words, taught that the Logos was not personal but a-personal. Consequently, when Bernard argues that it was the pagan-influenced Philo whose doctrine of the Logos inspired the apologists to view the Logos as a distinct person from the Father, his thinking is entirely backwards.
As Edgar J. Lovelady explains, “the Hellenic…Logos was the rational principle or impersonal energy which was responsible for the founding and organization of the world.”[10] Hence, prior to Philo, the pagan Greek philosopher “Heraclitus, [taught that the] Logos meant a law, an impersonal law of change,”[11]and “[the presocratic philosopher] Anaxagoras [taught that] Logos was Mind, animpersonal moving principle.”[12] This is acknowledged by Gheorghe Dobrin who states that “the word [Logos] has serious limitations,”[13] for “while [Logos did indicate] infinity, it did not indicate personality [to the pagan, philosophically astute Greeks of John’s day].”[14]Contrary to Bernard’s assertion that “the Greek apologists began to view the Logos as a separate person from the Father” due to the direct influence of “Greek philosophy, particularly [...the] teachings of Philo,”[15] Lovelady[16] reports that “we can state confidently that in Philo the Logos differed from the Logos in John with respect to persondeityexistenceactivity, historical manifestation, and terminology.”[17]
Adding to the irony is a subject that is worthy of further consideration at a later time, but deserves brief mention here. This is the fact that one could plausibly argue that Oneness theology/Modalism, as articulated by Bernard and others, is traceable to pagan religion. Charles Hodge explains that “The Triad [as opposed to the Biblical doctrine of the Trinity] of the ancient world[18] is only a philosophical statement of the pantheistic theory which underlies all the religion of antiquity.”[19] In all pagan religious “systems,” Hodge continues, “whether ancient or modern, there is a Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis; the Infinite becomes finite, and the finite returns to the Infinite.”[20] Hodge’s point is that the pagan Triads of the ancient world held to a belief in one divine being which has three modes of relating to creation. The first mode is infinite, the second finite, and the third is a return to the infinite. Concerning the Oneness doctrine of God, Bernard states:
[After the Arians], The second class of true monotheists believes in one God, but further believes that the fulness of the Godhead is manifested in Jesus Christ. They believe that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are manifestations, modes, offices, or relationships that the one God has displayed to man.[21]
The modalistic conception of God, ironically, looks more like the pagan conception of the Triad than it does the God who reveals himself in Scripture.
The Semitic Logos: The (Personal) Memra of God
Daniel Boyarin, furthermore, while of the belief that Philo’s Logos is, like John’s Logos, a distinct divine Person,[22] demonstrates that “there were other Jews [besides Philo], and, moreover, not only Greek speaking ones, who manifested a version of Logos theology.”[23] Boyarin:
Notions of the second god as personified word or wisdom of God were present among Semitic-speaking Jews as well. [...] The leading candidate for the Semitic Logos is, of course, “The Memra” of God, as it appears in the para-rabbinic Aramaic translations of the Bible in textual contexts that are frequently identical to ones where the Logos hermeneutic has its home among         Jews who speak Greek.[24]
So close, in fact, is the personal “Memra” of God doctrine of these Jews that Boyarin, after surveying numerous theological and contextual parallels between John’s prologue and Jewish commentaries on the OT featuring the Word/Logos/Memra of God, concludes that “theMemra performs many, if not all, of the functions of the Logos of Christian Logos theology.”[25] This directly contradicts Bernard’s attribution of Logos theology to “the Greek Apologists,”[26] demonstrating that their idea of “the Logos as a second divine person”[27] was not only not unique to philosophers like Justin Martyr, but found a place within Judaism itself.
The literature on the subject of the so-called “two powers in heaven” doctrine is extensive, and shows that the differentiation of Divine Persons in the Godhead was not the product of cultural admixture and religio-philosophical syncretism. Daniel Boyarin correctly notes that such an interpretation of the “two powers in heaven” doctrine is more likely an ideologically driven reconstruction of the past by present Rabbinical scholars[28] than it is an attempt to understand the complex interrelationships between multiple “in-house” debates arising from various exegetical/interpretive difficulties faced by devout Jews.[29]
Concluding Remarks

The foregoing essay is intended not to settle the issue of whether Christ existed eternally as a distinct Divine Person, co-equal with God the Father, that issue is settled alone by sound exegesis,[30] for Scripture alone is the source of all Doctrine. Instead, what the foregoing has sought to demonstrate is that such attacks on the pre-existence of the Personal, Distinct, and Co-Equal Logos of God are not only anti-Scriptural but likewise expresses a doctrine of the Logos that is closer to the writings of pagan philosophers than its proponents would have their readers believe. Oneness theologians like Bernard attack the doctrine of the Trinity as being the product of pagan philosophizing, and then proceed to identify the Logos of God in John 1 as an impersonal plan, as pagan-influenced philosophers did. Such internal incoherence is a symptom of a deeper problem.
The rejection of the Truth, who is the Eternal, Distinct, Co-Equal with the Father and the Spirit, Personal Logos is what leads to the confusion which riddles the works of non-Trinitarians. The foregoing argumentation is concerned, therefore, with stripping away the ad hoc arguments of Oneness theologians like Bernard, as  they are nothing more than a smoke-screen behind which these men think they can hide from the Eternal Son of God. And if they are faced with their errors, it is the prayer of the present author that they will be granted sight to see their idolatry for what it is, be granted repentance, and be forgiven and reconciled to the Trinity.

[1] The Oneness of GodVolume I (Missouri: Word Aflame Press, 1983), 266.
[2] Bernard, The Oneness of God, 265.
[3] Bernard, The Oneness of God, 266.
[4] Oneness and Trinity, (Missouri: Word Aflame Press, 1991), 11.
[5] Dalcour, A Definitive Look, 58ff.
[6] A Definitive Look at Oneness Theology: Defending the Tri-unity of God (Maryland: University Press of America, 2005), 55.
[7]“Was the New Testament Influenced by Pagan Philosophy?,” Christian Research Institute, accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.equip.org/articles/was-the-new-testament-influenced-by-pagan-philosophy/#christian-books-5.
[8] ibid.
[9] ibid. (emphasis added)
[10] “The Logos Concept:A Critical Monograph on John 1:1 Abridged by the Author,” in Grace Theological Journal 4.2 (Spring, 1963), 15.
[11] Lovelady,The Logos Concept, 18. (emphasis added)
[12] ibid.(emphasis added)
[13] “The Introduction of the Concept of Logos in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel,” in Perichoresis 3/2 (2005), 216.
[14] ibid. (emphasis added)
[15] Bernard, The Oneness of God, 266.
[16] Lovelady’s position is somewhat different from that of Nash, interpreting Philo’s Logos as “oscillating between a personal and impersonal being...” (20). Nevertheless, the scholarly consensus is that “in spite of all personification, Philo is not really thinking of a personal guide and companion. The Logos is the world of ideas Knowledge of God comes by the discipline of contemplating the unseen archetypes.” (C.H. Dodd, quoted in Donald A. Hagner, “The Vision of God in Philo and John: A Comparative Study,” in Journal of the Evangelical Society 14 (1971), 84.
[17] Lovelady,The Logos Concept, 20. (emphasis added)
[18] The notion of pre-Christian “trinities” is an old one that still finds popular expression among Jehovah’s Witnesses.
[19] Systematic Theology: Volume I (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1940), 433.
[20] ibid.
[21] The Oneness of God, 15.
[22] “The Gospel of the Memra: Jewish Binitarianism and the Prologue to John,” in  The Harvard Theological Review Vol. 94, No. 3 (July, 2001), 249-252.
[23] Boyarin, The Gospel of Memra, 252.
[24] Boyarin, The Gospel of Memra, 252-253.
[25] Boyarin, The Gospel of Memra, 257.
[26] The Trinitarian Controversy in the Fourth Century, (Missouri: Word Aflame Press, 2011), 10.
[27] ibid.
[28] Most notably Alan F. Segal in his seminal work, The Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and Gnosticism (Baylor University Press, reprint 2012), 339 pp.
[29] “Beyond Judaisms: Metatron and the Divine Polymorphy of Ancient Judaism,” in Journal for the Study of Judaism 41 (2010), 323-365.
[30] For a solid exegetical refutation see Burgos, Michael. Kiss the Son: A Christological Apology in Response to David K. Bernard's The Oneness of God (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), 150 pp.