
by Hiram R. Diaz III
An Apologetical Reflection on Dialogical Rules of Engagement
Language
use varies not only from one group to another, but also from context to
context. Academicians, for instance, generally seek to constrain
subjective, emotive language as much as possible in order to focus their
readers’ attention on the content being argued either for or against.
Outside of academic circles, generally most of us employ subjective,
emotive language, interestingly, to the same end. Persuasive
interpersonal communication, in fact, seems to rest largely on a
speaker’s apparent subjectivity and empathy, whereas non-persuasive
communication of this kind is deficient in apparent subjectivity and empathy.
Within their respective contexts, granting that interlocutors are aware
of the context’s rules of engagement (e.g. whether they are engaging in a
specialized academic disputation or an informal conversational debate),
these modes of communication are not problematic. However, if one is
unaware of the rules of engagement, then he is bound to misunderstand
the meaning of his interlocutor’s assertions.
For
example, the word “all” can function in several different ways in any
given informal context. Informal contexts often use the word all
hyperbolically, as a means of emphasis. Contextually, assertions of the
variety “All x are y!” typically are not quantitatively precise, but
serve to emphasize a large quantity of some particular “y.” “All” would
mean “most,” not each and every individual x. More precise informal
contexts may involve the use of “all” in conjunction with a place,
signifying not the entirety of that place’s population, but the entirety
of the people representative of that place. The sentence “All New
Yorkers are Yankees fans,” for instance, does not mean each and every
New Yorker is a fan of the Yankees. Rather, it means that all native New
York baseball fans are Yankees fans. The quanitative all here is precise, but it is limited to a subset of the absolute All in
the tautologous assertion “All permanent New York residents are New
Yorkers.” The precise use of the word all, in other words, is shown to
be relative to a particular subset of the complete set of permanent New
York residents.
Oftentimes,
as has been mentioned already, a failure to properly interpret the
informal use of, for instance, the universal quantifier all can
lead to much confusion between interlocutors. Informal discourse must
be interpreted according to the rules of engagement employed by
interlocutors. As regards formal discourse, similarly, the rules of
engagement must be understood if proper interpretation is to be
achieved. What is key to achieving understanding between interlocutors,
then, is both parties understanding the rules of engagement. Are they
engaged in informal discourse? Then set-A rules apply. Are they engaged
in formal discourse? Then set-B rules apply. The broader categories of
formal and informal, moreover, can be further refined so as to ensure
that formal scientific discourse, for instance, is not interpreted
according to the rules of engagement in formal philosophical, or
literary contexts.
To put the
matter simply: The words we use typically have several meanings, and
these meanings are native to particular contexts. The contexts here
refer to (i.)a general dialogical context one is engaging in (e.g.
Formal vs. Informal), (ii.)the sub-context of that general context (e.g.
Formal-Philosophical vs. Informal-Philosophical), and (iii.)the narrow
context between specific interlocutors (e.g.
Formal-Philosophical-Ontological vs.
Informal-Philosophical-Ontological). With this in mind, we may be able
to better articulate our own arguments, as well as better understand
which criticisms against our argumentation are legitimate and which are
not.
The
explicit purpose of this article is to better elucidate and, therefore, understand
illegitimate criticisms of theologically sound argumentation, i.e.
criticisms that ignore dialogical contexts.
I. Misrepresenting Misrepresentation